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Abstract
This study extends the extant literature on corporate philanthropy by exploring the indirect effect
of physical attractiveness of CEOs on corporate philanthropy under conditional effects of family
ownership and control. Recent empirical studies in psychology suggest that egalitarian values are
negatively related to physical attractiveness. Based on these findings, we propose that physically
attractive CEOs invest less in corporate philanthropic activities than less attractive peers as they
have lower egalitarian values. Leveraging upper echelons and stewardship theory, we further
consider the moderating impact of family ownership and control on the indirect relationship
between the physical attractiveness of a CEO and philanthropy mediated through egalitarianism.
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2To what extent do chief executive officers (CEOs) impose their personal values on philanthropy
decisions? This question is of substantial practical significance, especially for corporate boards
and society at large. Upper echelon theory asserts that strategic decision-making in general is less
of a technical endeavor than an interpretive one, and executives interpret business situations
through highly personalized lenses, shaped by their experiences, personalities, and values. Among
the many empirical tests of upper echelons theory, the vast majority have examined the effects of
CEOs’ demographic traits (Huang, 2013; Manner, 2010); a few have explored the effects of CEOs’
personalities (Petrenko, Aime, Ridge, & Hill, 2016); and fewer have considered the role of CEOs’
values in corporate philanthropy (Buchholtz, Amason, & Rutherford, 1999).
However, demographic traits were criticized for the black box problem (Hambrick, 2007).
Furthermore, scant attention was given to more underlying traits of executives such as their values
as they were not directly observable or measurable (Brickley, Smith, & Zimmerman, 1997, p. 27).
Although psychologists might argue that psychometric measures for gauging managerial values
could be formulated, Hambrick, commenting on the limitations of psychometric measures, stated:
“It requires very intrusive access to large numbers of executives...who are notoriously unwilling
to submit themselves to scholarly poking and probing” (Hambrick, 2007, p. 337).
Recent empirical developments in the field of psychology have found a relationship
between physical traits of individuals, such as physical attractiveness, and their underlying
egalitarian values, thus also resolving the black box problem by associating demographic traits of
individuals (like physical appearance) with underlying values. For instance, Price, Kang, Dunn,
and Hopkins (2011) found that physically attractive individuals had lower egalitarian values.
Business ethics scholars on the other hand found that CSR activities of a firm, such as philanthropy,
are influenced by a manager’s egalitarian values. For instance, Panwar, Paul, Nybakk, Hansen, &
3Thompson (2014) suggested that individuals with egalitarian beliefs supporting rectification of
existing inequalities in society and philanthropy were a vital instrument for eliminating these
inequalities (Bobo, 1991; Feldman & Steenbergen, 2001).
The above-mentioned findings in the field of psychology and corporate philanthropy have
significant implications for predicting philanthropic decisions taken by CEOs. As the physical
attractiveness of CEOs can help scholars predict their egalitarian values and hence interest in
philanthropy, our study provides an opportunity to respond to repeated calls by Hambrick to
incorporate managerial values in corporate philanthropic decisions (Hambrick & Mason, 1984;
Hambrick, 2007), while at the same time resolving the black box problem to some extent by
theoretically connecting physical attractiveness as a demographic trait (Morrow, 1990) to the
moral and personal values of a CEO, which is significantly important for philanthropic decisions
(Hemingway & Maclagan, 2004).
Conducting such a study, especially in the Indian context has even greater significance. In
2018, the Ministry of Corporate Affairs in India issued preliminary notices to nearly 300 firms for
not complying with philanthropic spending requirements as set by the government (“Centre issues
notice,” 2018). Furthermore, despite India being one of the fastest growing emerging market, it
remains least philanthropic country amongst all South Asian nations (Manku, 2015). Even Jason
Wingard, vice-dean of executive education at the Wharton School, indicated that it was ironic that
“even as the country’s [India’s] recent economic boom has created a new class of millionaires—
much as the Industrial Revolution did in America at the end of the 19th century—these individuals
and successful Indian corporations have been slow to increase their levels of charitable giving”
(“How India’s new philanthropists,” 2011). India’s richest one percent held 58 percent of the
country’s total wealth, while the global richest one percent held 50 percent of wealth (“Income
4inequality gets worse,” 2019). Thus, the poor-rich divide was comparatively higher in India,
making philanthropic donations even more relevant for India. Finally, scholars have also urged
to explore in detail the drivers of corporate philanthropy in emerging markets such as India
(Jamali & Karm, 2018). Thus, by conducting a country specific study, our study contributes
towards the understanding of variation in philanthropy among firms as influenced by CEOs
physical attractiveness.
Nevertheless, CEOs do not have complete discretion in injecting personal values into
strategic decisions, including corporate philanthropy. They are limited by the influence of other
top management team (TMT) executives as well as the ownership concentration and control of
family members. In emerging markets such as India, since business are usually owned by families
(Khanna & Palepu, 2000) and they are likely to have an influence on decisions made by the CEOs
depending on their level of ownership and control (Peng & Jiang, 2010), we test the relationship
between a CEO’s physical attractiveness and corporate philanthropy within the boundary condition
set by the family business,  i.e., their ownership and control. Based on stewardship theory
(Anderson & Reeb, 2003; Davis, Schoorman, & Donaldson, 1997) we assert that family members
of a firm are likely to consider themselves as stewards and give importance to non-economic goals
as well (Lamb & Butler, 2018). As ownership concentration and control of family members
increases, egalitarian values of physically attractive CEOs may not be able to negatively impact
philanthropy as much compared to when ownership concentration is low or CEO is not a family
member. Based on a sample of 647 firms and subsequently 162 family firms, we find evidence in
support of our propositions.
5Literature Review and hypothesis
Corporate Philanthropy and Egalitarian Values
Though the significance of organization-level factors in promoting philanthropy is
indisputable, however, the role of CEO traits on philanthropic decisions cannot be ignored, as it
is the CEOs who make most of the corporate decisions. In this context, the role of CEO
personality (Petrenko et al., 2016), attitude (Dennis, Buchholtz, & Butts, 2009) and values (Choi
& Wang, 2007) on corporate philanthropy has been explored. Extending the literature, we
specifically explore how egalitarian values of CEO as signaled through their physical
attractiveness (Price, Brown, Dukes, & Kang, 2015; Price et al., 2011) could influence their
corporate giving behavior. We explain our assertions ahead.
Egalitarianism refers to an individual’s belief in the equitable distribution of resources
(Nathan, 1983). An individual is considered egalitarian when he or she believes that social status
and other resources should be equally held across all social groups. Thus, such individuals are
more likely to believe in charity and philanthropy so that the suffering segment of the society such
as poor citizens could also benefit. However, not all individuals are egalitarian. Recent studies
indicate that physically attractive individuals are less likely to have egalitarian values (Price et al.,
2015; 2011).
Physical Attractiveness and Egalitarian Values
Studies in the field of psychology have empirically found that the physical attractiveness of an
individual was negatively related to egalitarianism, especially in males (Price et al., 2011,
2015). Holtzman, Augustine, and Senne (2011) have confirmed facial attractiveness was
negatively related to prosocial behavior, a trait related to egalitarianism (Zhao, Ferguson, &
Smillie, 2016). The study by Holtzman et al. (2011) specifically found that prosocial traits such as
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be a measure of facial attractiveness (Grammer and Thornhill, 1994). In fact, Grammer and
Thornhill in their research claimed their study was the “first study to indicate that measured facial
symmetry affects positive judgments about facial attractiveness” (p. 240). For this reason, software
like Anaface (that we employ in this study) also measures facial attractiveness based on facial
symmetry (Hooton, 2014). Other studies focusing on bodily attractiveness also reached a similar
conclusion. In a prisoner’s dilemma game in many experimental economic studies, individuals
who were more attractive did not cooperate with others (Sanchez-Pages & Turiegano, 2010;
Shinada & Yamagishi, 2014; Takahashi, Yamagishi, Tanida, Kiyonari, & Kanazawa, 2006;
Zaatari & Trivers, 2007). Similarly, it was found that attractive males were inegalitarian in
resource distribution decisions. In a study focused on evaluating redistribution of wealth (from
richer to poorer) by rich males, it was found that attractive males were more likely to oppose this
redistribution (Petersen, Sznycer, Sell, Cosmides, & Tooby, 2013).
Scholars have explained several possible reasons for this negative relationship between
egalitarianism and physical attractiveness. Physically attractive people are preferable social
associates (Langlois et al., 2000). This is because attractiveness creates a “halo effect,” where
attractiveness is assumed to be linked with several other underlying positive traits, such as
intelligence, social skills, health, and developmental stability (Dion, 2002; Eagly, Ashmore,
Makhijani, & Longo, 1991; Feingold, 1992; Grammer, Fink, Møller, & Thornhill 2003; Nedelec
& Beaver, 2014). The halo effect results in the preferential treatment of physically attractive
people. For instance, political electoral candidates were found to have an advantage if they looked
more attractive (Banducci, Karp, Thrasher, & Rallings, 2008; Ballew & Todorov, 2007; King &
Leigh, 2009). Similar implications were found for preferential job offers or higher wages given to
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preferential treatment in society (Eagly et al., 1991; Haidt & Keltner, 2004). The preferential
treatment given to attractive individuals increases their bargaining power in social settings by
increasing their persuasive abilities. For instance, attractiveness of a presenter may prompt
conscious cognitive or subconscious response inferences about the person’s expertise, capabilities
and trustworthiness, thus enhancing their power on the receiver (Praxmarer & Rossiter, 2009).
This enhanced bargaining power of physically attractive people has implications for
egalitarian values. Explaining egalitarian implications for attractive people, Price, Sheehy-
Skeffington, Sidnaius, and Pound (2017) stated:
“Due to their increased bargaining power, formidable/attractive individuals would have been
relatively more likely to prevail in social competitions, and thus to benefit from the inequities in
status and resource distribution that would have been the outcome of such competitions (p.626).”
Price et al. (2017) further explained that this ability of physically attractive individuals “to
benefit from social norms that promote inequality” rather than norms that encourage equality
resulted in a reduced tendency to support egalitarian norms (Price et al., 2015, Price et al., 2011).
Extending these findings to the field of business management, the physical attractiveness of CEOs
has significant implications for their egalitarian values and thus philanthropic behavior as
explained ahead. Hence, we hypothesize:
Hypothesis 1a: Egalitarian values of a CEO are positively associated with corporate philanthropic
activities of an organization.
Physical Attractiveness and Philanthropy- Mediating Effect of Egalitarian Belief
Empirical findings in field of psychology indicate that physically attractive CEOs are likely to
have lower egalitarian values. The egalitarian doctrine rests on the idea that all human beings are
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sort, such as that people deserve to receive the same resources or be treated the same (Arneson,
2002). Egalitarian values, thus, imply believing in one’s obligation to meet the basic needs of
individuals in society and redress the problem of social inequality (Bobo, 1991). Those with
egalitarian values have positive attitudes towards social welfare policies and work to uplift the
socio-economic status of people in need. Individuals with egalitarian beliefs also have a higher
social responsibility orientation and positive attitude towards different aspects of CSR, such as
philanthropy or having prosocial values (De Cremer & Van Lange, 2001; Thompson, Panwar, &
Hansen, 2010). For instance, CEOs with higher egalitarian values were found to have less vertical
pay inequity (Chin & Semadeni, 2017), to be more even-handed in allocating firm resources
(Gupta, Briscoe, & Hambrick,2018), and to invest more in CSR activities (Chin, Hambrick, &
Treviño, 2013), compared to less egalitarian peers.
Overall, CEOs who are physically attractive are less likely to hold egalitarian values and
thus may not prefer investment in philanthropic activities. Hence, we hypothesize:
Hypothesis 1b: Corporate philanthropic activities of an organization are negatively associated
with the physical attractiveness of a CEO.
Hypothesis 1c: Egalitarian value mediates the relationship between corporate philanthropy and
physical attractiveness of a CEO.
Family Firms and Stewardship Theory
The notion of stewardship is synonymous with family businesses (Donaldson & Davis, 1991).
Being a “steward” implies being a “baton-holder,” as family business owners must ensure multi-
generational sustainability of business (Campopiano, De Massis, & Chirico, 2014). This
sustainability of business is likely to be accomplished by not only taking care of family members
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the community at large (Fox & Hamilton, 1994; Le Breton-Miller & Miller, 2006; Miller & Le
Breton-Miller, 2005). Philanthropy provides an appropriate platform to support the community at
large, as it helps bolster reputation and social capital among external stakeholders (Campopiano et
al., 2014), thereby ensuring long-term sustenance of the business (Li, Au, He, & Song, 2015).
Although social expectations to engage in philanthropic activities exist for all types of business,
the notion of stewardship makes these expectations even more vital for family firms. Empirical
evidence also suggests that family firms believe that philanthropic activities would grant them the
reputational capital necessary for long-term business survival (Breeze, 2009). For instance, in the
United States, philanthropic donations by family firms and foundations have been of the order of
$67 billion per year, representing 2.8 percent of total income (Feliu & Botero, 2016). In Indian
family business also, philanthropic donations have been of the order of 3.10 percent of the total
income of firms (“The million dollar donors report,” 2015), almost equivalent to those of American
family firms.
However, the extent to which family firms follow stewardship behavior depends on the
ownership concentration of members of family firms in the business (Westhead & Howorth, 2006).
As the ownership concentration of family members increases, their commitment towards
sustainable goals of the business also increases (Soleimanof, Rutherford, & Webb, 2018). Thus,
family firms with a high ownership concentration have a greater propensity to ensure the long-
term viability of the business, nurture a personal relationship with external stakeholders, including
society, and enhance the reputation of the business through philanthropic activities (Campopiano
et al., 2014). Conversely, when family ownership concentration is low, family members are less
concerned about passing the “baton” to future generations, so attaining external stakeholder
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support becomes less relevant for them. This is likely to be even more true for family firms in
India. Since institutional mechanisms in these markets are weak, family firms often rely on
trustworthy relationships to conduct their business (Lamin, 2013). Thus, Indian family firms need
to be even more proactive in their philanthropic activities to gain the support of the community at
large (Lev, Petrovits, & Radhakrishnan, 2010) to ensure long term sustenance of the business
(Habbershon & Williams, 1999).
Furthermore, as ownership concentration of family members increases, their ability and
intent to effectively monitor the actions of the CEO also increases (Chen, Cheng, & Dai, 2013).
Thus, they are more likely to be involved in decisions taken by CEOs and influence corporate
practices such as philanthropy. This implies that as ownership concentration of family members
increases, the impact of CEOs’ personal values like egalitarianism on corporate decisions like
philanthropy may decline (Chin, Hambrick, & Treviño, 2013). This is because, high family
ownership concentration implies high power the family is able to exercise over CEO, less impact
that CEOs’ egalitarian values could have in presence of heightened stewardship value of family
menbers and this less discretion that  CEO could exercise in making philanthropic decisions
(Arregle, Hitt, Sirmon, and Very, 2007).
Thus, higher levels of ownership concentration by family members would mitigate the
effect of the egalitarian values disposition of the CEO on corporate philanthropy. Conversely,
lower levels of ownership by family members will increase the discretion exercising ability of the
CEO and the CEO's egalitarian values will be more highly reflected in the corporate philanthropy.
In other words, the ability of a physically attractive CEO, driven by low egalitarian values, is likely
to be inhibited by the stewardship values established by family members of the business. With an
increase in ownership concentration of family members, a CEO is more likely to mend his behavior
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towards philanthropy owing to the informal power bestowed in the hands of family members
(Arrègle, Hitt, Sirmon, & Very, 2007). Overall, despite having personal likeability to promote
inequality through diminished egalitarian values, even a physically attractive CEO would increase
philanthropic activities when ownership concentration is high. Hence, we hypothesize:
Hypothesis 2. CEO facial attractiveness has a conditional indirect effect on corporate philanthropy
through egalitarian values, where the mediation effect of egalitarian values is moderated by family
ownership, such that the indirect effect of CEO physical attractiveness on corporate philanthropy
is more negative when family ownership concentration is low.
Outsider vs. Family CEO
In many family firms, members of the family are also involved in the management of the firm by
holding executive positions in the business, thus being a part of the management beyond
ownership. Holding executive positions in the firm or company group enhances the family
member’s ability to monitor non-financial operations, such as corporate philanthropy, and fulfill
their stewardship role (Davis et al., 1997; Henssen, Voordeckers, Lambrechts, & Koiranen, 2014,
Wasserman, 2006). A physically attractive CEO who is a family member is likely to experience
conflict because the CEO may personally favor inequality, however, the family stewardship values
implying need to sustain business in the long run may force the CEO to show stewardship behavior
through philanthropic activities. Thus, again the impact of low egalitarian values of a physically
attractive CEO on corporate philanthropy would be diminished, if the CEO is a family member
(Miller, Breton-Miller, & Scholnick, 2008). The outsider CEO, on the contrary, has a much lower
burden of business continuity and may try to maximize immediate financial incentives through
competitive rather than egalitarian strategies.
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Family CEOs have been found to show positive steward behavior, and this behavior has
influenced firms’ survival (Vallejo, 2009) and financial performance (Kellermanns & Eddleston,
2007) as well as employees’ trust and commitment (Davis, Allen, & Hayes 2010). Overall, the
obligation to adopt family-imposed altruistic values, hence contributing toward philanthropy,
would be greater for family CEOs than non-family CEOs. Consequently, when a physically
attractive CEO is not a family member, impact of low egalitarian values of a physically attractive
CEO on philanthropic contributions would be more adverse. Hence, we hypothesize:
Hypothesis 3. CEO facial attractiveness has a conditional indirect effect on corporate philanthropy
through egalitarian values, where the mediation impact of egalitarianism is moderated by CEO
type, such that the indirect effect of CEO physical attractiveness on corporate philanthropy is more
negative when the CEO is a non-family member.
Data and Method
Sample and Data Collection
Data was collected for the Group “A” and Group “B” listed Indian firms on Bombay Stock
Exchange (BSE). According to the criterion set by BSE, firms listed under group A and B
categories need to score well on parameters such as market capitalization, turnover and corporate
governance reporting. Furthermore, we did not consider banks, foreign owned and public-sector
units. Excluding these firms, resulted in a list of 1401 firms which belonged either to Group A or
Group B. Financial data for the firms was collected for a period of three years, i.e., from 2014-
2016 from the financial database, Prowess of the Centre for Monitoring Indian Economy.
In the present study, we required the images of the CEOs to calculate the facial beauty or
attractiveness scores of the CEOs. Thus, another major reason for considering Group A and Group
B firms was that due to their performance implications, these firms were more likely to be covered
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by the media, thus chances of availability of appropriate images of a CEO were high. Also, since
Indian firms are dominated by male CEOs, to avoid any sample biasness, we also removed all the
firms with a woman CEO. To measure the facial attractiveness of the CEOs we used Anaface,
which is a web-based facial image application software and freely available from
www.anaface.com. Recently several scholars have relied on this software to examine the facial
attractiveness of executives and other targets (Halford & Hsu, 2014; Hoegele, Schmidt, & Torgler,
2016; Ling, Luo, & She, 2016). Next, two postgraduate students from a UK university
independently searched for the availability of images of the CEOs from firms in the Group A and
Group B categories. Following Hoegele et al. (2016) for each CEO the students searched for two
images with sufficient resolution, face looking directly at the camera and visibility of facial
landmarks. These three criteria are also the major requirements to obtain accurate facial beauty
scores when using Anaface. The students obtained the images of the CEOs by searching across
company websites, annual reports, LinkedIn, Google Search, Google Images, and Google News.
Only those CEOs and their images were considered on which both the students had an exact
agreement about the appropriateness of the images. After filtering firms based on the above-
mentioned criterion, and also eliminating firms with incomplete financial information on variables
considered in the study, we were left with a sample of 647 firms, thus giving us data points for
647*3 years = 1941 firm years and 659 pairs of images for each student (as there were 12 CEO
replacements in our sample). Depending on the variable, information was obtained from CMIE
prowess (financial database of Indian firms), annual reports of the firm, company’s website,
Bloomberg, Wallmine, MarketScreener, Google and Yahoo images among online sources.
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Dependent Variable.
Corporate Philanthropy: As philanthropy can be measured in several ways, we focused on firm’s
philanthropy as donations and investment in community development only, as they are most
commonly used measures (Feliu & Botero, 2016). We considered the natural log of the
philanthropy to reduce variability in the data.
Independent Variables
Facial Attractiveness Index (FAI). The effect of facial attractiveness has been well explored in
psychology literature based on ratings given by survey respondents (Cunningham,1986;
Cunningham, Barbee, & Pike, 1990; Cunningham, Roberts, Barbee, Druen, & Wu, 1995).
However, recently use of facial geometry to determine attractiveness has also gained pace.
Following approaches of Schmid, Marx, and Samal (2008) and Halford and Hsu (2014), we
calculate a facial attractiveness index (FAI) of CEOs from Anaface, which is a web-based image
analysis application software. Anaface computes the facial beauty scores of a person based on
facial geometry and does not consider eye, skin complexion or color of the skin (Halford & Hsu,
2014). This application provides beauty scores on a scale of 1 to 10 with scores closer to 10
indicating higher facial attractiveness or beauty (Halford & Hsu, 2014; Hoegele et al., 2016). The
algorithm of Anaface is proprietary and it calculates the geometry of faces using neoclassical
beauty, research papers and scientific studies (Halford & Hsu, 2014). After an image is uploaded
over anaface.com, the application allows for manually placing 17 different markers at different
facial landmarks (refer to Figure 1). These markers help in calculating the overall beauty score of
the uploaded image by considering the horizontal symmetry of the face, the ratio of eye width to
innerocular distance, ratio of nose length to ear length, ratio of the nose width to mouth width, etc.
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Insert Figure 1 about here
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To ensure reliability and validity (Halford & Hsu, 2013; Hoegele et al., 2016) of the CEO facial
attractiveness measure we followed a two-step procedure. First, two postgraduate students from a
UK University, over a one-month period independently uploaded each of the CEO images over
anaface.com six times and using the 17 markers obtained six facial beauty scores for all the 893*2=
1786 images. Next, we calculated the average facial beauty score value for each CEO image across
both the students. Thus, two average beauty score values were generated corresponding to each of
the CEOs, for whom then the grand average was taken for each CEO. Correlation between facial
beauty scores as calculated by the two postgraduate students was 0.92.
Family Ownership Concentration (FOC). This was captured as the percentage of equity owned by
the family in a firm.
CEO Type. To identify a family CEO, the name of the CEO or Managing Director considered in
the present study was cross-checked with the promoter shareholding list available at the BSE
website. If the CEO’s name appeared in the promoting shareholder list, it was marked as one
else zero (La Porta & Lopez-de-Silanes, 1999).
Egalitarian values (CEO Pay gap). We calculated egalitarian values with vertical pay gap and
horizontal pay gap. Vertical pay gap was calculated as the ratio of CEO pay and the average pay
of TMT members, excluding CEO, such that a higher pay ratio reflected lesser egalitarian values
(Siegel & Hambrick, 2005). Horizontal pay gap was measured by coefficient of variation in the
total pay of TMT members other than CEO. The coefficient of variation was calculated by dividing
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the standard deviation of group members’ compensation by the mean compensation of the group
(Siegel & Hambrick, 2005).
Interaction effect of Family Ownership Concentration and CEO Pay Gap (FOC*CEO Pay Gap).
To calculate interaction effect, we mean centered both the variables, i.e., scores of CEO Pay Gap
and ownership concentration of family and then multiplied the obtained values from each other.
Mean centering was performed to reduce the chances of multicollinearity (Shieh, 2010). We
considered both horizontal and vertical pay gap for interaction effects.
Interaction effect of CEO Type and CEO Pay Gap (CEO Type* CEO Pay Gap). We mean centered
both the scores of CEO Pay Gap and the family CEO variable and multiplied the values with each
other to calculate the interaction effect. We considered both horizontal and vertical pay gap for
interaction effects.
Control Variables
To eliminate any errors pertaining to the measurement of FAI, we also controlled for CEO facial
image characteristics like smiling face, baldness, eyeglasses and color of the photograph using
dummy variables. When the CEO image had eyeglasses, it was coded as 0, else 1. Similarly,
smiling face was coded as 0, else 1. Colored photograph was 1, else 0. Bald head including
forehead bald head was coded as 0, else 1. Some of the demographic traits of a CEO such as
education and tenure in an organization could also influence the level of corporate philanthropy.
Thus, we controlled for these factors as well. For education, business education can make
individuals specifically sensitive towards philanthropy and related issues (Manner, 2010). Thus, if
a CEO had MBA degree, then the education of the CEO was coded as 1, else 0. Similarly, the
tenure of the CEO in the organization could also influence attitude toward philanthropic activities
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(Huang, 2013). Hence, we calculated the natural log of total number of years a CEO has been
associated with an organization. Apart from this, other permanent physical dimensions of facial
appearance such as facial-width-to-height ratio (fWHR) may also influence philanthropic giving
by CEO (Geniole, Molnar, Carré, & McCormick, 2014). Hence, we controlled for this construct
as well. fWHR was measured as the distance between the two zygions relative to the distance
between the upper lip and the highest point of the eyelid. Open source, ImageJ software was used
to measure height of upper face (the distance between the lip and brow) as well as the bizygomatic
width (left and right zygion) of the images. From these two values, ratio of facial width to height
was calculated (Hahn et al., 2017). Apart from this we also controlled for skin tone as skin color
may influence facial attractiveness. Skin tone may vary from dark to brown to fair.  Again, two
postgraduate students at a UK university rated each CEO on a scale of 1 to 5 for the skin tone,
where 1 stood for very dark and 5 represented very fair. Average of the two ratings received for
each CEO was taken as a measure of the skin color of the CEO. Correlation between rating given
by the two raters was 0.89.
Apart from this several organization level variables could also influence corporate
philanthropy such as slack available with the organization, its past performance, firm age, and size
of the firm. Thus, we controlled for these variables as well. Industry effects were also controlled
for.Slack was measured as cash in hand. Past performance was measured as Return on Assets
(ROA). Firm age was calculated as the natural logarithm of the total number of years since the
time of the firm’s inception. The size of the firm was calculated as the natural logarithm of the
total number of employees. Natural logarithm was used to reduce variability in variables.
Similarly, we also controlled for revenues of the firm by taking natural log of the values.
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Estimation Strategy
To test hypotheses 1a, 1b and 1c we conducted regression analysis followed by mediation analysis.
For mediation analysis, we used Model 4 of the Process macro (Version 3.4) (Hayes, 2018). In
this model, corporate philanthropy was the outcome variable, CEO Pay gap (egalitarian values)
was the mediating variable and FAI was the predictor variable. To test hypotheses 2 and 3,
moderated-mediation models were employed using the Model 14 of the Process Macro. Figure 2
presents the three models.
------------------------------------------------------
Insert Figure 2 about here
-------------------------------------------------------
Following a similar strategy as employed by Buckley and Tian (2017), we employed a
bootstrapping approach for conducting the mediation analysis and the two moderated-mediation
analyses. According to Preacher et al. (2007) and Hayes (2018), bootstrapping is at present one of
the most reliable approach for mediation analysis. A bootstrapping re-sample value of 1,000 was
used for all the three models (Hayes, 2018). Using White’s heteroskedastic-consistent standard
errors, all the estimates were corrected for heteroskedasticity. We initially ran a base model (Model
0) with all variables and corporate philanthropy, as the outcome variable. Subsequently, mediation
analysis was conducted followed by the two moderated-mediation models.
Results
Table 1 presents the descriptive statistics and correlation coefficients for the sample of 1941 firm
years. As can be observed from Table 1 the average facial attractiveness was 7.2 with a standard
deviation of 1.24. Previous studies conducted in developed markets with Anaface also reported
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similar facial attractiveness scores (Halford & Hsu, 2014). However, we also conducted a
robustness test as explained below, where a primary study was conducted in the Indian market to
assess the validity and reliability of the software. Furthermore, the correlation coefficient between
the facial attractiveness index of CEO and corporate philanthropy was found to be negative and
significant (r= -0.31, p<0.001), thus signaling some preliminary evidence for physical
attractiveness and corporate philanthropy relationship.
------------------------------------------------------
Insert Table1 about here
-------------------------------------------------------
Table 2 presents results of the regression and mediation analysis. First, we employ a base
model (Model 0) to test the relationships between the control variables, the independent variable
and corporate philanthropy. Column 1 of Table 2 presents the results of the main regression
analysis. The beta coefficients of cash-in-hand (β = 0.181, p<0.01) and revenues (β =0.218,
p<0.01) were positive and significant among control variables.
Next, we employ a mediation analysis to test hypotheses 1a, 1b and 1c. Through hypothesis
1a we speculated that egalitarian values of CEO negatively affected corporate philanthropy whilst
through hypothesis 1b we speculated that corporate philanthropy is negatively associated with
facial attractiveness of CEO. Through hypothesis 1c we asserted that CEO Pay gap (egalitarian
values) mediated this relationship. As can be observed from column 4 of Table 2, the coefficients
of both vertical and horizontal pay gap (egalitarian values) on corporate philanthropy were
negative and significant (βVertical Pay Gap = -0.127, p<0.001; βHorizontal Pay Gap = -0.116, p<0.001),
lending support to hypothesis 1a.  Next, from column 1 in Table 2 we observe that the coefficient
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of FAI on is negative and significant (β = -0.056, p<0.001). This lends support to H1b. Finally,
from columns 1 and 2 in Table 3, we observe that the indirect effect of FAI on corporate
philanthropy through CEO vertical and horizontal pay was negative and statistically different from
zero (θVertical Pay Gap =-0.0485; LCI=-0.0520; UCI=-0.0389; θHorizontal Pay Gap =-0.0361; LCI=-0.0392;
UCI=-0.0297). Overall, these implied a support for Hypothesis 1c.
------------------------------------------------------
Insert Table 2 about here
-------------------------------------------------------
------------------------------------------------------
Insert Table 3 about here
-------------------------------------------------------
To test hypotheses 2 and 3, we ran four moderated-mediation analyses, one involving FOC
as a moderator affecting the relationship between CEO Pay gap (vertical and horizontal) and
corporate philanthropy and other having CEO Type as a moderator affecting the same relationship.
Table 4a and 4b present the results of the moderated mediation analysis. In Table 5a and 5b, we
present the coefficient for the indirect effect of FAI on corporate philanthropy through CEO Pay
gap (vertical and horizontal) for different levels of FOC and also for different levels of CEO Type.
------------------------------------------------------
Insert Table 4a about here
-------------------------------------------------------
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------------------------------------------------------
Insert Table 4b about here
-------------------------------------------------------
------------------------------------------------------
Insert Table 5a about here
-------------------------------------------------------
------------------------------------------------------
Insert Table 5b about here
-------------------------------------------------------
Hypothesis 2 stated that CEO facial attractiveness has a conditional indirect effect on
corporate philanthropy through CEO Pay gap (egalitarian values), where the mediation effect of
CEO Pay gap is moderated by family ownership concentration, such that the indirect effect of CEO
physical attractiveness on corporate philanthropy is more negative when FOC is low. From column
1 of Table 4a, we can observe the beta coefficient of the interaction term of CEO Pay Gap
(Vertical) and FOC on philanthropy was positive and significant (β = 0.061, p<0.001) as well as
the interaction term of CEO Pay Gap (Horizontal) and FOC was positive and significant (β = 0.049,
p<0.001). Column 1 of Table 5a, suggests that indirect effect of FAI on philanthropy, mediated by
vertical pay gap, was more negative and statistically significant at low level of FOC (θ =-0.0325;
LCI=-0.0362; UCI=-0.0288) than at an average level of FOC (θ =-0.0258; LCI=-0.0279; UCI=-
0.0228) and a high level of FOC (θ =-0.0188; LCI=-0.0225; UCI=-0.0137). Specifically, a 1%
increase in FAI, led to decline of 0.0325%, 0.0258% and 0.018% in corporate philanthropy.
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 Similarly, for horizontal pay gap also as depicted in column 1 of Table 5b, indirect effect
of FAI on philanthropy was more negative and statistically significant at low level of FOC (θ =-
0.0292; LCI=-0.0318; UCI=-0.0264) than at an average level of FOC (θ =-0.0236; LCI=-0.0256;
UCI=-0.0221) and a high level of FOC (θ =-0.0179; LCI=-0. 0211; UCI=-0.0138). We thus receive
evidence in support of hypothesis 2.
Through hypothesis 3 we speculated that CEO facial attractiveness has a conditional
indirect effect on corporate philanthropy through CEO Pay gap, where the mediation effect of
CEO Pay gap is moderated by CEO Type, such that the indirect effect of CEO physical
attractiveness on corporate philanthropy is more negative when the CEO is not a family member.
From column 1 of Table 4b, we observe the interaction term of CEO Pay Gap (Vertical) and CEO
Type on philanthropy was positive and significant (β = 0.052, p<0.001) as well as the interaction
term of CEO Pay Gap (Horizontal) and CEO Type was positive and significant (β= 0.043,
p<0.001).
Further, column 2 of Table 5a and 5b reveals that the indirect effect of FAI on corporate
philanthropy was more negative and significant when CEO was not a family member for both
vertical as well as horizontal pay gap respectively (θVertical =-0.0338; LCI=-0.0371; UCI=-0.
0.0263), (θHorizontal =-0.0300; LCI=-0.0326; UCI=-0.0255) than when the CEO was a family
member (θVertical =-0.0196; LCI=-0. 0210; UCI=-0.0149); (θHorizontal =-0.0182; LCI=-0.0207;
UCI=-0.0146). Specifically, a 1% increase in FAI, led to a 0.0338% and a 0.0196%, decrease in
philanthropy, through CEO pay when the CEO was a non-family member and when the CEO was
a family member respectively for vertical pay gap. For horizontal pay gap, a 1% increase in FAI,
led to a 0.0300% and a 0.018%, decrease in philanthropy, through CEO pay when the CEO was a
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non-family member and when the CEO was a family member respectively. Overall, hypothesis 3
is supported.
Robustness Test
We conducted five robustness tests, with two tests related to the measurement of FAI, one test
related to the measurement of corporate philanthropy, a test incorporating the change in corporate
philanthropy law in India and a test introducing TMT size as an alternate moderator.
Test 1
To further confirm the validity of CEO attractiveness measures, following extant literature
(Halford & Hsu, 2014; Hoegele et al., 2016) we conducted a primary survey in India. We selected
Indian respondents as due to skin color, opinion in developed countries could have been biased.
First, we randomly selected 50 CEOs out of the 273 CEOs considered in the secondary study. Next
180 consumers from a Tier 1 and a Tier 2 city in India were invited to participate in this study.
Only 147 consumers (Females= 72) accepted the invitation to participate in the study. All the
respondents through email received an online questionnaire link for completing the survey. Each
page of the questionnaire had a CEO image. Against each CEO image, a five-point rating scale
with one being the least attractive and five being the most attractive (Halford & Hsu, 2014) was
provided. Only 128 respondents returned the questionnaire out of which six were removed from
further analysis because of missing information. Thus, data of 122 respondents (Females = 59)
was subjected to further analysis. The median age of the respondents was 29 years, and the mean
annual income was $7,150. Furthermore 72 respondents were from a Tier 2 city of India and the
remaining were from a Tier 1 city. The Facial Attractiveness Index was positively and significantly
correlated (r= 0.37, p<0.01) with the survey-based attractiveness measure in the correlation test.
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Test 2
To examine the consistency of respondent’s rating, we also showed images of trial subjects who
were unrelated to the CEO sample and asked respondents to rate them as well. Subjects who
resembled fashion models received higher attractiveness ratings ranging from 7.9 to 8.6 than those
with average looks whose values ranged from 6.3 to 7.5.
Test 3
Philanthropy Deviation: The Indian government in 2014 mandated that firms earning profits of
more than 78 million dollars need to contribute two percent of profits towards philanthropic cause.
To ensure that philanthropic needs were not purely driven by law, we subtracted corporate
philanthropic donations made by the firm each year from the expected amount based on profits
earned, as mandated by government. Thus, instead of corporate philanthropic donations, we
considered level of deviation from expected donations as mandated by government. Using these
values, we again ran the same regression, keeping all independent and control variables same.
Although value of beta coefficients changed, however, overall, their significance did not change
thus leading to acceptance of all our hypothesis.
Test 4
Total Philanthropy: We also included the expenditure on environmental and pollution control by
a focal firm as part of corporate philanthropy. Though the values of beta coefficients changed,
results remained statistically significant.
Test 5
TMT size as moderator: We tested the role of TMT size as an alternate moderator in addition to
FOC and CEO Type. The influence of TMT size as a moderator was found to be significant. As
we were exploring a new dimension of upper echelon theory i.e. identifying personal values
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through physical traits rather than demographic traits, it was vital to control for CEO-TMT
interphase (Heyden et al, 2017). Since TMT size is the most commonly used variable, we
controlled for the same.
General Discussion & Conclusion
Can CEO’s physical attractiveness make a difference in the level of philanthropy that a corporate
indulges into? In this study, we examine this issue and further explore how this relationship
between FAI and corporate philanthropy is moderated mediated by egalitarianism as a mediator
and family ownership and control as moderators in emerging markets. We thus document the effect
of CEO’s physical attractiveness on philanthropy by integrating empirical findings in the field of
psychology related to egalitarian values and physical attractiveness with philanthropy literature.
Through our first hypothesis, we find that physically attractive CEOs were less likely to be
egalitarian. Through our second hypothesis we found that less egalitarian CEOs invested less in
philanthropic activities, at least in the Indian context. Through our third hypothesis we found that
egalitarian values mediated this relationship. However, our findings do not imply that FAI is
overall positively or negatively related to corporate philanthropy, as we only examined two
mediating paths via vertical and horizontal CEO pay gaps, moderated by family ownership
concentration and family CEO.
Extant literature indicates that the leader’s physical appearance influences several
individual and firm level outcomes such as leader’s compensation (Graham, Harvey, & Puri,
2016), or negotiating power (Haselhuhn, Wong, Ormiston, Inesi, & Galinsky 2014), risk taking
ability (Welker, Goetz, & Carré, 2015), aggressive behavior (Goetz et al., 2013), personal lending
(Duarte, Siegel, & Young, 2012; Ravina, 2012), hedge fund investments (Pareek & Zuckerman,
2013), financial misreporting (Jia, Lent, Ravina & Zeng, 2014), unethical behavior (Geniole et al.,
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2014), firm’s performance (Pillemer, Graham, & Burke, 2014; Rule & Tskhay, 2014), and
competitive performance (Tsujimura & Banissy, 2013; Trichas, Schyns, Lord, & Hall, 2017). Our
findings corroborate with extant literature, where physical attractiveness influences corporate
philanthropy.
Furthermore, we test the relationship between philanthropy and CEO’s physical
attractiveness under the boundary condition as set by family ownership and control. Using
stewardship theory, we asserted that due to the sustainability issue of businesses, especially in a
country with institutional voids, it was vital for family members to gain long-term trust and
reputation amongst external stakeholders. Philanthropic activities provide an opportunity for
family businesses to achieve this goal. Thus, as their ownership concentration increased, they were
better able to exercise control and make the CEO abide by family values and mission, which
dampened the effect of personal egalitarian values on corporate philanthropy. Our findings extend
the past literature on corporate philanthropy where family firms were found to have a positive
impact on philanthropy (Campopiano et al., 2014; Du, 2017; Lamb & Butler, 2018; Laguir, Laguir,
& Elbaz, 2016). Similarly, TMT size, though in a robustness study, was also found to moderate
the relationship. Furthermore, relationships remained robust with alternative measures of corporate
philanthropy as well.
This study makes the following contributions to corporate philanthropy, upper echelon,
and family business literature. First, we add to the corporate philanthropy literature by examining
the influence of egalitarian values through physical attractiveness of CEOs, on philanthropy.
Individual-level drivers of corporate philanthropy have largely focused on the business case of
philanthropy by virtue of profit maximization or utility maximization perspective (Gautier &
Pache, 2014). Our study adds to this aspect of philanthropy, where the underlying egalitarian
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values of CEOs mediated the relationship between CEO facial attractiveness and philanthropic
behavior. Our findings assert that the physical attractiveness of a CEO is negatively associated
with philanthropic activities.
Second, although several drivers of corporate philanthropy have been explored, they have
either focused on firm-level factors (Adams, Hoejmose, & Kastrinaki, 2017; Li, Song, & Wu,
2015) or individual-level factors (Raub, 2017). Studies exploring the integrative effect of
individual and firm-level factors are scant, despite scholars urging the need for the same (Gautier
& Pache, 2015). Our study is a step in this direction. We explore the impact of an individual
level factor, i.e. CEO’s physical attractiveness under the boundary condition of CEO pay gap
mediation made more nuanced by the firm-level moderating factors like family ownership
concentration and control by family. In this regard, we also establish the role of CEO
egalitarianism as a mediator and extend the literature on CEO egalitarian values. The extant
literature suggests CEOs' political ideology impacts their vertical compensation pay gap (Chin
& Semadeni, 2017). Our findings add to this stream of literature by asserting that physically
attractive CEOs also have less egalitarian values. Furthermore, extant studies from developed
markets present mixed results about the stewardship behavior of family businesses. Some studies
have found a positive impact of ownership by family firms (Campopiano et al., 2014; Dyer &
Whetten, 2006), while others claimed a negative impact (Morck & Yeung, 2004). The present
study adds to the ongoing debate on the social behavior of family firms by exploring its moderating
impact on mediated relationship, thus further enhancing evidence of family business philanthropy.
Third, we contribute to the upper echelon literature. Scholars have generally considered
demographic traits such as CEOs’ education to explain differences in philanthropy across firms
(Hemingway & Maclagan, 2004). However, demographic traits were criticized as they assumed
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certain intervening processes, which were not proved (Priem, Lyon, and Dess, 1999, p. 936). By
incorporating role of physical attractiveness, we not only extend boundaries of demographic
traits of CEO in philanthropy context, but by virtue of theoretically banking on empirically
established intervening process i.e. egalitarian values that affects philanthropic decisions, we try
to resolve this black box phenomenon at least to some extent by empirically testing the mediating
role of CEOs’ egalitarian values and find evidence for the same.
Managerial Implications
Today, several Indian firms are keen on hiring CEOs who value not only profit but social
contributions as well. The study presents a major milestone for the board of directors and
stakeholders at large who through our study are encouraged to consider philanthropy dynamics
that exist in their firms and reconsider recruitment of physically attractive CEOs who otherwise
provide financial benefits to the firm through higher market valuation (Graham et al., 2016).
Companies are increasingly moving towards a sustainable growth model, and attractive CEOs can
make this task difficult because of their low egalitarian values for philanthropy. Overall, physical
attractiveness of a CEO, can help boards of directors and stakeholders at large to appoint an
appropriate CEO who genuinely believes in philanthropy.
Although physically attractive CEOs can enhance firm’s perceived performance, overall,
they can have an adverse influence on a firm’s reputation due to poor egalitarian attitude towards
philanthropic initiatives. Furthermore, although appointing family members in the top
management team has often been charged with the adverse effect of nepotism, at least for
sustainable businesses physically attractive family CEOs are more likely to abide by steward
values and hence do not deter philanthropic activities, compared to non-family CEOs. Lastly, as
ownership concentration of family members decreases, a physically attractive CEO is more likely
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to exercise his personal values at least in the context of philanthropy. Thus, family members with
a low ownership concentration need to identify ways to fulfill the non-economic goals of the
business, if they hire physically attractive CEOs. Boards can also encourage large size TMTs as in
the presence of large TMTs, physically attractive CEOs may be unable to exercise their low
egalitarian values through less philanthropic contributions.
Limitations and Directions for Future Research
Though we make significant contributions, yet our study suffers from several limitations, which
paves way for future research. First, we do not empirically examine the underlying egalitarian
value of a CEO, while explaining the physical attractiveness and philanthropy relationship.
Though, we rely on the extant psychology literature explaining that physically attractive
individuals have lower egalitarian values (Price et al., 2015; 2011), future studies in the corporate
context could benefit by directly measuring such values of CEOs through primary studies. Second,
for defining physical attractiveness, we leverage only on facial beauty, whereas overall personality
could also influence the egalitarian mindset. Although we focus only on facial attractiveness
following the extant literature, future studies should explore the same phenomenon using overall
personality as an attractiveness measure. Third, the software considers only innerocular distances
and not skin color. However, skin color could also influence facial attractiveness, thus future
studies could conduct the studies taking skin color into consideration also. Fourth, we conduct the
study in only one of the emerging markets. Future studies could explore if similar results are
obtained in developed markets as well or what cultural values could create differences in the
philanthropic activities of CEOs. Future research can also explore further family business
dynamics and how they create boundary conditions for physical attractiveness of CEO and
philanthropy relationship. For instance, founder CEOs may have more stewardship values,
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however, such values may get diluted from generation to generation (Berrone, Cruz, & Gomez-
Mejia, 2012; Gomez-Mejia, Cruz, Berrone, & De Castro, 2011), leading to a stronger impact of
physical beauty on corporate philanthropy. Similarly, more distant family members may not share
similar stewardship values as close family members. Similarly, the interplay between
demographics, personality, and physical appearance of the CEO can be studied in the context of
corporate philanthropy. Lastly, the upper echelon theory explains the impact of several traits of
CEO on philanthropy. However, physical attractiveness of CEO could also influence these
relationships, which could be explored in future studies.
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Compliance with Ethical Standards:
All procedures performed in studies involving human participants were in accordance with the
ethical standards of the institutional research committee and with the 1964 Helsinki declaration
and its later amendments or comparable ethical standards.
Informed consent:  Informed consent was obtained from all individual participants included in
the study.
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Table 1: Descriptive Statistics and Correlation Matrix of Complete Sample (n= 1941)
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19
1 LnCorporatePhilanthropy 1
2
Facial
Attractiveness
Index
-0.31 1
3 FOC 0.27 0.09 1
4 CEO Type 0.21 0.12 0.23 1
5 LnFirm Age 0.2 0.1 0.08 0.11 1
6 LnFirm Size 0.25 0.12 0.12 0.15 0.14 1
7 Cash-in-hand(Slack) 0.24 0.14 0.07 0.06 0.08 0.18 1
8 Bald Head 0.002 0.008 0.003 0.002 0.001 0.004 0.003 1
9 Eyeglasses 0.008 0.005 0.009 0.005 0.004 0.002 0 0.004 1
10 Smiling Face 0.004 0.001 0.004 0.008 0.002 0 0.003 0.009 0.001 1
11 ColoredPhotograph 0.005 0.007 0.003 0.007 0.009 0 0.005 0 0.005 0.004 1
12 CEO-MBA 0.11 0.09 0.05 0.12 0.06 0.08 0.18 0.002 0.007 0 0.003 1
13 LnCEO-Tenure 0.11 0.14 0.08 0.16 0.17 0.14 0.14 0.003 0.0004 0.002 0.009 0.11 1
14 CEO-fWHR -0.15 0.001 0.1 0.08 0.05 0.002 0.09 0.007 0.004 0.0003 0.0002 0.06 0.09 1
15 ROA 0.05 0.06 0.1 0.07 0.02 0.01 0.03 0 0.0001 0.0005 0.0003 0.01 0.04 0.06 1
16 Skin Color 0.135 0.163 0.009 0.007 0 0.005 0.001 0.003 0.002 0.006 0.0002 0.0008 0.0003 0.0001 0.0002 1
17 CEO VerticalPay Gap
-
0.215 0.123
-
0.090
-
0.098 0.105 0.096 0.117 0.005 0.006 0.001 0.0003 0.108 0.085 0.084 0.073 0.105 1
18 HorizontalPay Gap
-
0.184 0.116
-
0.105
-
0.103
-
0.097 0.072 0.11 0.003 0.004 0.002 0.0006 0.082 0.063 0.075 0.068 0.082 0.113 1
19 LnRevenue 0.356 0.109 0.078 0.065 0.134 0.113 0.144 0.007 0.001 0.005 0 0.07 0.058 0.034 0.113 0.031 0.108 0.104 1
Mean 1.28 7.2 0.48 0.44 4.6 5.1 8.3 0.13 0.27 0.67 0.92 0.26 2.7 1.74 3.5 3.1 2.83 0.36 7.47
S.D. 1.01 1.24 0.42 0.96 1.52 2.34 9.7 0.45 0.53 0.49 0.31 0.431 1.1 0.48 9.8 1.3 2.01 0.34 3.32
r-0.06-0.07, p<0.01,r-0.08 onwards, p<0.001, r- 0.04,p<0.10, r-0.05,p<0.05
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Table 2: Results of Regression Analysis and Mediation Analysis (n= 1941)
Variable
Model 0 Mediation Models
LnCorporate Philanthropy LnCorporate Philanthropy CEO Pay Gap (Vertical) CEO Pay Gap (Horizontal)
β s.e. p. value β s.e. p. value β s.e. p. value β s.e. p. value(1) (4) (7) (10)
Facial Attractiveness Index -0.056 0.02 0.005 -0.06 0.02 0.001 0.273 0.09 0.003 0.125 0.04 0.000
CEO Pay Gap (Vertical) -0.127 0.04 0.000
CEO Pay Gap (Horizontal) -0.116 0.04 0.002
Firm Age 0.21 0.15 0.161 0.23 0.17 0.177 0.182 0.11 0.083 0.131 0.1 0.17
Firm Size 0.173 0.109 0.112 0.168 0.1 0.078 0.126 0.08 0.115 0.108 0.067 0.107
Cash-in-hand (Slack) 0.181 0.06 0.001 0.175 0.05 0.000 -0.132 0.07 0.049 -0.112 0.086
0.193
Bald Head -0.01 0.01 0.317 -0.01 0.01 0.23 -0.007 0.006 0.246 0.005 0 0.097
Eyeglasses 0.09 0.13 0.49 0.07 0.11 0.63 0.015 0.03 0.66 0.011 0.02 0.638
Smiling Face 0.005 0.01 0.617 0.004 0.01 0.66 0.017 0.09 0.857 0.011 0.03 0.713
Colored Photograph 0.002 0.01 0.841 0.003 0.01 0.5 0.009 0.04 0.822 0.001 0.005
0.841
Skin color 0.032 0.02 0.109 0.036 0.03 0.15 0.021 0.02 0.271 0.035 0.02 0.144
CEO-MBA 0.073 0.06 0.234 0.078 0.06 0.22 0.084 0.07 0.243 0.047 0.065 0.469
LnCEO Tenure 0.11 0.09 0.221 0.13 0.1 0.194 0.175 0.13 0.193 0.223 0.157 0.155
CEO-fWHR -0.09 0.06 0.133 -0.09 0.06 0.17 -0.036 0.025 0.15 -0.018 0.016 0.262
ROA 0.073 0.05 0.144 0.078 0.05 0.12 0.055 0.036 0.012 0.021 0.015 0.161
LnRevenue 0.218 0.07 0.000 0.216 0.06 0.000 0.042 0.01 0.002 0.022 0.007 0.001
Adjusted R2 0.186 0.248 0.234 0.226
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Table 3: CEO and Horizontal Pay Gap Mediation Models (Indirect Effect)
CEO Vertical Pay Gap Mediation Model
[Indirect Effect (θ)] a
(1)
CEO Horizontal Pay Gap Mediation Model
[Indirect Effect (θ)] a
 (2)
-0.0485 (-0.0520/-0.0389) -0.0361 (-0.0392/-0.0297)
aThe indirect effect, indicates statistical significance at 95% confidence interval. The lower
confidence interval (LCI) statistic is before the slash and the upper confidence interval (UCI)
statistic is after the slash in the bracket.
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Table 4a Results of Moderated-Mediation Regressions (Moderator is FOC) (n=1941)
Variable
LnCorporate Philanthropy CEO Pay Gap (Vertical) CEO Pay Gap (Horizontal)
β s.e. p. value β s.e. p. value β s.e. p. value
(1) (4) (7)
Facial Attractiveness Index -0.049 0.016 0.002 0.273 0.092 0.003 0.125 0.036 0.000
CEO Pay Gap (Vertical) -0.124 0.04 0.001
CEO Pay Gap (Horizontal) -0.11 0.035 0.001
CEO Pay Gap (Vertical)*FOC 0.061 0.02 0.002
CEO Pay Gap (Horizontal)*FOC 0.049 0.015 0.001
FOC 0.046 0.016 0.004
Firm Age 0.18 0.12 0.133 0.182 0.105 0.083 0.131 0.095 0.17
Firm Size 0.161 0.095 0.091 0.126 0.08 0.115 0.108 0.067 0.107
Cash-in-hand (Slack) 0.164 0.049 0.000 -0.132 0.067 0.049 -0.112 0.086 0.193
Bald Head -0.001 0.0008 0.211 -0.007 0.006 0.246 0.005 0.003 0.097
Eyeglasses 0.05 0.09 0.582 0.015 0.034 0.66 0.011 0.023 0.632
Smiling Face 0.002 0.005 0.689 0.017 0.09 0.857 0.011 0.03 0.713
Colored Photograph 0.007 0.006 0.246 0.009 0.04 0.822 0.001 0.005 0.841
Skin color 0.027 0.018 0.133 0.021 0.019 0.271 0.035 0.024 0.144
CEO-MBA 0.071 0.056 0.207 0.084 0.072 0.243 0.047 0.065 0.469
LnCEO Tenure 0.11 0.07 0.116 0.175 0.134 0.193 0.223 0.157 0.155
CEO-fWHR -0.075 0.054 0.167 -0.036 0.025 0.15 -0.018 0.016 0.262
ROA 0.071 0.049 0.15 0.055 0.036 0.128 0.021 0.015 0.161
LnRevenue 0.202 0.061 0.000 0.042 0.014 0.002 0.022 0.007 0.001
Adjusted R2 0.253 0.242 0.231
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Table 4b Results of Moderated-Mediation Regressions (Moderator is CEO Type) (n=1941)
Variable
LnCorporate Philanthropy CEO Pay Gap (Vertical) CEO Pay Gap (Horizontal)
β s.e. p. value β s.e. p. value β s.e. p. value
(1) (4) (7)
Facial Attractiveness Index 0.051 0.017 0.002 0.273 0.092 0.003 0.125 0.036 0.000
CEO Pay Gap (Vertical) -0.171 0.052 0.001
CEO Pay Gap (Horizontal) -0.108 0.035 0.002
CEO Pay Gap (Vertical)*CEO
Type 0.052 0.015 0.000
CEO Pay Gap (Horizontal)*CEO
Type 0.043 0.013 0.000
CEO type 0.032 0.011 0.003
Firm Age 0.21 0.15 0.161 0.182 0.105 0.083 0.131 0.095 0.17
Firm Size 0.151 0.087 0.083 0.126 0.08 0.115 0.108 0.067 0.107
Cash-in-hand (Slack) 0.169 0.048 0.000 -0.132 0.067 0.049 -0.112 0.086 0.193
Bald Head -0.005 0.004 0.211 -0.007 0.006 0.246 0.005 0.003 0.097
Eyeglasses 0.056 0.114 0.624 0.015 0.034 0.66 0.011 0.023 0.632
Smiling Face 0.003 0.008 0.707 0.017 0.09 0.857 0.011 0.03 0.713
Colored Photograph 0.001 0.005 0.841 0.009 0.04 0.822 0.001 0.005 0.841
Skin color 0.031 0.022 0.158 0.021 0.019 0.271 0.035 0.024 0.144
CEO-MBA 0.081 0.072 0.262 0.084 0.072 0.243 0.047 0.065 0.469
LnCEO Tenure 0.145 0.121 0.234 0.175 0.134 0.193 0.223 0.157 0.155
CEO-fWHR -0.089 0.065 0.171 -0.036 0.025 0.15 -0.018 0.016 0.262
ROA 0.067 0.047 0.155 0.055 0.036 0.128 0.021 0.015 0.161
LnRevenue 0.22 0.067 0.001 0.042 0.014 0.002 0.022 0.007 0.001
Adjusted R2 0.250 0.247 0.238
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Table 5a: Indirect Effects at Different Levels of Moderators (Mediator: CEO Pay Gap
(Vertical) as mediator)
aThe indirect effect, indicates statistical significance at 95% confidence interval. The lower
confidence interval (LCI) statistic is before the slash and the upper confidence interval (UCI)
statistic is after the slash in the bracket.
b Mean denotes the mean value, low denotes one s.d. below the mean value; high denotes one
s.d. above the mean value.
Moderated-Mediation Model for CEO
Pay Gap (Vertical) as mediator and
FOC as moderator
                                                (1)
Moderated-Mediation Model for CEO Pay
Gap (Vertical) as mediator and CEO Type
as moderator
                       (2)
Family Ownership
Concentration b
  [Indirect Effect
(θ)] a CEO Type [Indirect Effect (θ)]
a
Low (0.06)
-0.0325(-0.0362/-
0.0288)
Non-Family
CEO -0.0338(-0.0371/-0.0263)
Medium (0.48)
-0.0258 (-0.0279/-
0.0228) Family CEO -0.0196(-0.0210/-0.0149)
High (0.90)
-0.0188 (-0.0225/-
0.0137)
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Table 5b: Indirect Effects at Different Levels of Moderators (Mediator: CEO Pay Gap
(Horizontal) as mediator)
aThe indirect effect, indicates statistical significance at 95% confidence interval. The lower
confidence interval (LCI) statistic is before the slash and the upper confidence interval (UCI)
statistic is after the slash in the bracket.
b Mean denotes the mean value, low denotes one s.d. below the mean value; high denotes one
s.d. above the mean value.
Moderated-Mediation Model for CEO
Pay Gap (Horizontal) as mediator and
FOC as moderator
                               (1)
Moderated-Mediation Model for CEO Pay
Gap (Horizontal) as mediator and CEO
Type as moderator
                               (2)
Family Ownership
Concentration b
  [Indirect Effect
(θ)] a CEO Type [Indirect Effect (θ)]
a
Low (0.06)
-0.0292(-0.0318/-
0.0264)
Non-Family
CEO
-0.0300 (-0.0326/-0.0255)
Medium (0.48)
-0.0236(-0.0256/-
0.0221)
Family CEO -0.0182 (-0.0207/-0.0146)
High (0.90)
-0.0179(-0.0211/-
0.0138
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Figure 1: Image Appearance Over Anaface.com with Markers
55
Figure 2: Conceptual models of the Study
